WALLACE MENDELSON. Justices Black and Frankfurter: Conflict in the Court. Pp. x, 151. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961. $4.00 by Dorr, Harold
183
covers the entire field of antitrust so com-
prehensively and so well.&dquo; High praise
indeed, but amply justified! Mr. Neale
spent much time in research and investiga-
tion in Washington in 1952 as a Common-
wealth Fellow. Obviously he put this to
good use; for he appears to understand
their favorite trust-busting measure better
than do most Americans.
The first and major part of the book is
devoted to an exegesis of existing law,
covering not merely the Sherman Act, but
also the interrelated Clayton, Robinson-
Patman, and Celler-Kefauver Acts, includ-
ing the topics of price fixing, resale price
maintenance, price discrimination, monopo-
listic practices, and patents and interna-
tional cartels, with special attention to
problems of law administration and the
choice of remedies, civil and criminal. In
the main, this is a careful lawyerlike analy-
sis of judicial precedents, skillfully per-
formed without wasted words. Late cases,
since about the middle 1950’s, are not in-
cluded ; it is impossible to keep careful
legal writing completely up to date. The
author has well absorbed American ways
of legal thinking; perhaps we can detect a
trace of customary British denigration of
our law materials in his refusal to add cita-
tions to the cases he discusses. But this
is a minor fault, at most, since the prec-
edents are easily traced in our many
digests.
Of more interest to the general reader is
Part II, entitled &dquo;Antitrust Assessed,&dquo; con-
taining a chapter on &dquo;Antitrust as an
American Policy,&dquo; and the final chapter on
&dquo;Antitrust for Export?&dquo; Here the author
develops the interesting idea that the main-
spring of our policy is less the desire to pro-
mote free competition and remove trade re-
straints than it is a &dquo;distrust of all sources
of unchecked power.&dquo; So he finds an
ambivalence of attitude in that Americans
&dquo;tend to take a romantic view of the
achievements and efficiency of large indus-
trial organizations even while they take a
suspicious view of their power.&dquo; This con-
ception is hardly one for export, at least
to Britain, for there possession of power
&dquo;arouses a much lesser degree of anxiety,&dquo;
and the emphasis is much more &dquo;on the
use of power.&dquo; So Britain is prepared to
accept not so much our broad inclusive
policy as a series of specific prohibitions
of restrictive practices, outlawed in the
Sherman Act, and now banned in the Brit-
ish Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1956.
CHARLES E. CLARK
United States Circuit Judge
New Haven
Connecticut
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Professor Mendelson’s little book is a
study of constitutional interpretation con-
cerned primarily with the present task of
the Supreme Court or, more properly, with
the task of the individual justices: to find
solutions for &dquo;Atomic Age problems&dquo;
within the four corners of that eighteenth-
century document and at the same time
to retain an adequate degree of consistency
in the law. This monumental process
demands from the justices, among other
things, the selection of raw material from
the flow of litigations and the necessary
legal tools. It involves, also, the philoso-
phy of the judges and their individual
approaches to the judicial processes.
Professor Mendelson confines his investi-
gation largely to the latter factor, drawing
heavily upon the contributions of Justice
Frankfurter, representative of the &dquo;humili-
tarians, the pragamatists,&dquo; and of Justice
Black, an activist and representative of
those who profess to &dquo;see great visions
and feel compelled to embed them in the
law.&dquo; &dquo;The purpose of this little book,&dquo;
says the author, &dquo;is to explore the nature
of the judge’s job. If the emphasis is upon
the work of Justices Black and Frankfurter
that is not because they must be accepted
as ’heroes.’ It is rather that they repre-
sent with uncommon ability two great, if
differing, traditions in American juris-
prudence.&dquo; &dquo;
This is, in short, a study of judicial self-
restraint-or of the absence of it. It re-
views convincingly Justice Black’s attempts
to establish justice for the &dquo;underdog.&dquo; In
pursuit of his ideals, Justice Black may
well see the law as &dquo;simply a tool to be
manipulated in accordance with the judge’s
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vision of right and wrong.&dquo; With equal
clarity, the author presents Justice Frank-
furter, a recognized activist in his earlier
days, as a modern expounder of the doc-
trine of judicial self-restraint, the Court
spokesman for those who believe that the
judicial function &dquo;is to preserve a consti-
tutional balance between the several ele-
ments in a common enterprise. It main-
tains the ship, others set the course.&dquo;
Both are presented as liberals, imbued with
the ideals of social progress and popular
democracy and dedicated to the principles
of justice. The one, Justice Black, is
represented as advocating the theory that
the function of the judiciary is to do
justice, even if that means imposing
&dquo;Justice upon all other agencies of govern-
ment, indeed upon the community itself.&dquo;
The judicial pronouncements of Justice
Frankfurter take a less exalted view of the
Court’s responsibilities. The cases here
reviewed by the author demonstrate the
Frankfurter concept that the Court is &dquo;not
free to do Justice but bound to do justice
under law, i.e., in accordance with that
very special allocation of function and au-
thority which is the essence of Federalism
and the Separation of Powers.&dquo;
Professor Mendelson draws his con-
clusions from a series of cases analyzed
under the chapter headings &dquo;The Separa-
tion of Powers,&dquo; &dquo;Democracy,&dquo; and &dquo;Fed-
eralism.&dquo; Even though neither the case
analyses nor the conclusions are unique,
the book has the great merits of clarity
and precision. The study moves forward
with easy informality, and it has the fur-
ther merits of conciseness and personal
conviction.
HAROLD M. DORR
Professor of Political Science
University of Michigan
RICHARD P. LONGAKER. The Presidency
and Individual Liberties. (Cornell
Studies in Civil Liberty.) Pp. xii, 239.
Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press,
1961. $4.50.
Individual liberties are so intimately con-
nected with the judicial process in the
public mind that it has become common
practice to look to that branch of govern-
ment as their only truly constituted pro-
tector and defender. So deep is this belief
that there has been created, albeit sub-
consciously, a corollary conviction: that
the voice, office, and power of the presi-
dency are confined and limited to our in-
volvement in the world outside-where the
nation’s security and survival are chal-
lenged almost daily by a Khrushchev and
a Castro, by a China and a Laos, by a race
to put a man into space, and by nuclear
weapons and rockets with a thrust sufh-
cient to penetrate deep into the heart of
the United States.
To address oneself to The Presidency
and Individual Liberties, as does Professor
Richard P. Longaker, seems, on the sur-
face at least, either to be drawing the pro-
tection of human rights and freedoms into
an arena where it does not belong or,
conversely, to be adding problems beyond
his scope and competence to the tasks of
an already overburdened executive.
Yet if Professor Longaker, in this excel-
lent little volume, has done nothing more,
he has at the very least demonstrated that
&dquo;because the President is the primary
guardian of security, the real impact of
constitutional rights has taken place within
the executive’s domain [for] in a Cold War
liberty and security are jumbled together.&dquo;
In short, the evolving aspirations of the
Negro in the United States, for example,
have consequences, be they moral, political,
or social, that are keenly watched in vari-
ous parts of the world in which we, as a
nation and a people, are competing for
leadership and where values and ideology
are vital stakes in themselves.
Although Professor Longaker tells us
that his study deals with &dquo;the constitutional
obligation of the chief executive to protect
individual liberty,&dquo; this must not be taken
too literally, for he shows a keen aware-
ness of the extraconstitutional means, as
well as the moral necessity, for presidential
leadership in the entire field of civil rights.
What is in fact being examined is a
dynamic and available means to &dquo;invigorate
the liberating substance of the Constitu-
tion,&dquo; to make more meaningful to us, and
through us to others beyond our land, the
&dquo;traditional individual liberties&dquo; as a mat-
ter of vital concern in themselves, but
equally vital as a tool in the world com-
